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Abstract
The effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccination programs depends on individual-level compliance. Perceptions about
risks associated with infection and vaccination can strongly influence vaccination decisions and thus the ultimate course of
an epidemic. Here we investigate the interplay between contact patterns, influenza-related behavior, and disease dynamics
by incorporating game theory into network models. When individuals make decisions based on past epidemics, we find that
individuals with many contacts vaccinate, whereas individuals with few contacts do not. However, the threshold number of
contacts above which to vaccinate is highly dependent on the overall network structure of the population and has the
potential to oscillate more wildly than has been observed empirically. When we increase the number of prior seasons that
individuals recall when making vaccination decisions, behavior and thus disease dynamics become less variable. For some
networks, we also find that higher flu transmission rates may, counterintuitively, lead to lower (vaccine-mediated) disease
prevalence. Our work demonstrates that rich and complex dynamics can result from the interaction between infectious
diseases, human contact patterns, and behavior.
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Introduction
Human decision-making profoundly impacts the spread of
disease as well as the effectiveness of intervention measures.
However, decision-making has rarely been incorporated into
mathematical modelling of epidemics [1,2]. Vaccination not only
protects vaccinated individuals but also breaks chains of
transmission that would otherwise occur, thereby indirectly
protecting individuals who have not been vaccinated. Perceived
risks associated with disease and vaccination may critically
influence adherence and thus the ultimate fate of an epidemic.
Although federal mandates minimize these effects for some
diseases, for recurring epidemics like seasonal influenza whose
control relies on voluntary vaccination, our model predicts that
there may be a mutual feedback between behavior and disease:
high prevalence in one season may increase future vaccination,
thereby lowering future prevalence; conversely low prevalence
may decrease future vaccination, which ultimately increases
prevalence.
Recently, methods from classical game theory have provided
valuable insights into interactions between epidemiology and
decision-making [3]. For example, the elderly have high risks of
developing severe or fatal disease when infected by seasonal
influenza and thus are expected to vaccinate at high rates; younger
people, on the other hand, perceive lower risks and thus less
incentive to vaccinate [4]. However, school-aged children have
more social contacts than the elderly and can therefore transmit
the disease in much higher numbers [5]. Game theoretical
approaches have also shown that herd immunity, or the indirect
protection of vaccination, can lead to a so-called ‘‘free-rider’’
problem. Individuals may forgo vaccination when they perceive
that they are sufficiently protected by the immunity of others. This
poses a problem for voluntary vaccination programs, because the
best strategy for a community as a whole may be very different
from that for short-term, individual self-interest. In particular,
complete eradication by voluntary vaccination may be under-
mined by self-interested behavior [2]. However, this problem can
be averted using a fast and reliable ring vaccination strategy that
targets infected individuals and their contacts, as has been shown
for smallpox [6]. This analysis shows that introducing contact
network structure can significantly alter the predicted impact of
rational behavior on vaccine coverage levels.
Here, we explore the interrelationship among network struc-
ture, vaccination decisions and annual influenza dynamics.
Specifically, we investigate the impacts of (1) contact heterogene-
ity, (2) the transmission rate of flu and (3) the number of prior
seasons considered (remembered) when individuals make vacci-
nation decisions on the threshold number of contacts above which
individuals are expected to vaccinate and the resulting fraction of
the population expected to vaccinate. We have developed a
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strategies in a population with explicit network structure that
experiences seasonal epidemics and use cobwebbing [7] to predict
oscillatory patterns in vaccination behavior. We show that as the
transmissibility of the disease increases, the equilibrium state
evolves from a fixed strategy into a two-strategy oscillation and
back into a fixed strategy. In reality, however, influenza vaccina-
tion patterns are relatively stable. We explore several explanations
for the discrepancy between our model and the observed patterns
and show that predicted oscillations dampen when individuals
make vaccination decisions based on multiple prior years of
experience.
Methods
Network Theory Background and Epidemiological
Calculations
We model the interplay between the seasonal transmission of
influenza and human vaccination behavior using percolation
theory applied to contact networks. In general, network-based
models have shown that contact patterns can dramatically impact
disease dynamics [8,9]. In a network model, nodes represent
individuals; edges connecting nodes represent contacts that can
lead to disease transmission; the number of edges coming out of a
node is called its degree; and the distribution of these values is
called the degree distribution. Whether an outbreak will grow into
an epidemic depends on the degree distribution. All else equal, the
greater the variance in contact rates, the more vulnerable the
population [10]. Furthermore, an individual’s risk of infection
during an epidemic increases with the individual’s degree [9].
Therefore, with perfect information, individuals should consider
not only their own contact patterns but the local and overall
structure of their community when they decide whether to
vaccinate.
We build on the theory of epidemics on infinitely large random
graphs [10], in which the fate of any outbreak is determined by the
distribution of degrees within the network and the probabilities of
transmission across the edges in the network. In a network where
the degrees of individuals are independent of those of their
contacts, the degree distribution can be represented by wk,k~ f
0...?g, where wk is the probability that an arbitrary individual
from the population has k potential transmission contacts with
other individuals. Additionally, each edge (from a node i to a node
j) has a transmissibility, that is a probability that, if infected, i will
transmit disease to j during its infectious period; here we assume
individuals gain immunity upon recovery. If the transmissibilities
can be assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables on the edges of the network, then one
can calculate the expected size of an epidemic and other key
epidemiological quantities based solely on the expected (average)
transmissibility T across edges in the network. This iid assumption
breaks down if there is variation among nodes in terms of
infectiousness and/or susceptibility, because their edges will have
correlated probabilities of transmission [11,12].
T summarizes several aspects of disease spread including the
frequency of encounters between connected individuals, the length
of infectious period, and the probability that a given encounter will
lead to transmission. Here, we assume that the T values are
constant from year to year and thus ignore virus evolution as well
as naturally acquired cross immunity. Our analyses focus primarily
on the fairly wide range of transmissibility values that have been
estimated for seasonal influenza (0:06vTv0:26) [13].
The size of an epidemic started on a random network depends
in part on the transmissibility T. For a given degree distribution
wk fg , there is a critical transmissibility
Tc~
P?
k~1 kwk P?
k~1 kk {1 ðÞ wk
ð1Þ
below which a population is expected to experience only small
outbreaks, and above which large epidemics are possible but not
guaranteed. If TvTc, the number of infected individuals in the
epidemic is finite with probability 1.I fTwTc, then there is a
nonzero probability that a positive fraction of an infinitely large
population will become infected. The derivation of Tc and other
important epidemiological quantities in the network framework
are given in [10] and [14]. Note, that this theory predicts behavior
in a typical large random network with the specified degree
distribution; and the predictions will be inexact for networks with
extensive clustering or modularity.
Network Degree Distributions
We compare vaccination dynamics across three different classes
of networks: a pseudo-empirical network based on estimated
contact patterns in an urban setting, a homogeneous network in
which all individuals have almost identical degree, and a highly
heterogeneous (scale free) network in which degrees follow a
truncated power law distribution. Although flu networks are
neither completely homogeneous nor scale free, these comparisons
allow us to investigate the importance of network structure on the
interaction between vaccination behavior and flu transmission
dynamics. Our pseudo-empirical urban network is based on a
simulation of urban contact patterns using empirical census,
mobility, school, health care, employment, and other relevant
data. This distribution has been used previously to study the
spread of diseases through typical urban populations [9,13,15]. It
is bimodal with adult and school-aged children having mean
degree of approximately 20 and young children having a lower
mean degree between 5 and 10. The homogeneous network was
generated by applying a homogenizing procedure to the urban
degree distribution. Specifically, given degree distribution hk fg , its
Author Summary
When influenza spreads through a human population, its
dynamics are shaped by both the complex patterns of
contact that arise through our daily activities and individual
decisions about the prevention and treatment of flu
infections. However, until recently, mathematical models
of flu transmission have ignored complex interaction and
behavioral patterns in order to facilitate mathematical
analyses. Here, we combine two recent approaches to
modeling flu–network theory and game theory–to address
the interplay between contact patterns and host vaccina-
tion decisions during seasonal flu outbreaks. Intuitively, the
more contacts one has, the more likely he or she is to
vaccinate. However, under the assumption that people
make rational decisions based on complete information
about the prior seasonal epidemic, vaccination decisions
are predicted to vacillate dramatically. A severe epidemic in
one year inspires high vaccination rates in the following
year; this causes a milder epidemic which then leads to
lower vaccination rates in the following year; and the cycle
begins anew. We find further that the more homogeneous
the contact patterns, the more pronounced the vacillations
will be, and that decision-making based on multiple past
seasons (rather than just one) leads to much more
consistent behavior.
Behavioral Epidemiology on Networks
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yx~
X m{1 ðÞ =2
i~0
X m{1 ðÞ =2
k~0
m!
i!k! m{i{k ðÞ !
X x{1
y~1
hy
 ! i
h
m{i{k
x
X ?
y~xz1
hy
 ! k
:
This is the expected distribution if one were to calculate the
medians of m random variables drawn from the degree
distribution hk fg many times. The bigger the sample m, the
closer the median of the sample is the to median of the baseline
degree distribution; and thus as m increases, the resulting
homogenized distribution converges to a delta function on the
integers. Our homogeneous network is the m~63 homogenization of
the urban network degree distribution. Power law networks are
characterized by a majority of low degree individuals and a
minority of very highly connected individuals (having much higher
degrees than found in more homogeneous networks). We chose
the parameters of our power law network so that it has the same
critical transmissibility (Tc) as the urban network (0.055) [9]. (The
homogenized urban distribution network has a slightly higher
critical transmissibility (0.062).) Specifically, the probability of
degree k in the power law network is given by
Ck{2e{k=104 ð2Þ
truncated for kw200, where C is a normalizing constant. All three
distributions are shown in Figure 1B.
Vaccination Dynamics
To study the vaccination behavior of individuals, we adopt a
behavior model similar to that of [16–18]. In our model, each
individual decides to vaccinate based on knowing his or her degree
and the average per-contact risk of infection in prior seasons; he or
she does not directly consider personal infection history or the
histories of immediate neighbors. Individuals weigh their per-
ceived costs and benefits of vaccination and decide whether to
vaccinate accordingly. Let u be the baseline component of the
payoff corresponding to the value of a healthy life over the course
of an epidemic.
An individual’s cost of vaccinating (cV) includes the monetary
cost of vaccination, the perceived vaccine risks (reflecting both the
perceived probability of adverse events and their perceived
severity),long termhealthimpacts,and otherintangibles.Perceived
vaccine risks need not reflect actual vaccine risks. The cost of
infection (cI) also has a monetary component corresponding to
factors including missed work days, as well as the costs of doctors
visitsand medication.Influenza vaccinesareonly partiallyeffective,
that is, some vaccinated individuals remain susceptible to infection.
We assume that, if infected, a vaccinated individual experiences less
severe disease, but is equally infectious as a non-vaccinated,
infected individual. We representthis in our model with a reduction
in the severity (costs) of infection, cR. In our analysis, we assume
perceived values (Table 1) that have been estimated from survey
studies [4] and actual vaccine costs from [19]. Besides the costs of
the infection and vaccination, individuals are also aware of their
number of contacts (degree), and make independent estimates of
the risks of each outcome based on their degree.
The vaccination strategy vk of an individual of degree k is the
probability that the individual will be vaccinated. The payoff to an
individual of degree k as a function of its vaccination strategy vk is
given by the payoff function
Uk vk ðÞ ~u{vk cVzdkcR ðÞ { 1{vk ðÞ akcI: ð3Þ
where dk is the perceived probability of becoming infected if
vaccinated and ak is the perceived probability becoming infected if
not vaccinated. (We assume dkvak). Here, we implicitly allow
individuals to adopt mixed strategies such that vk~1 means
always vaccinate, but vk~0:5 means that the individual chooses to
vaccinate with probability 50%, choosing randomly each time. We
also assume that vaccination has no benefits beyond those related
to the current epidemic period. Given Eq. (3), we can determine
the strategies vB
k that maximize the payoff to an individual for
given risks of infection in terms of the costs and risks (see online
supplement). We use the term rationality to refer to our assumption
that individuals make vaccination decisions that yield the highest
personal utility (based on their perceived risks). A utility function
could also include family health and a wealth of other factors, but,
Figure 1. In a heterogeneous population, an individual’s decision to vaccinate depends on the number of his or her contacts
(degree) and the perceived epidemiological risk in the prior season. (A) When the costs of vaccination and infection are the same for
everybody, an individual should only choose to vaccinate if his or her risk exceeds a calculated threshold depending on the person’s degree (here
T~0:078). (B) The proportion of the population with each given degree are different for a homogeneous network (magenta histogram), an urban
network (blue bimodal histogram), and an exponentially-scaled power-law network (steeply descending green histogram). For a log-linear plot of the
degree distributions, see the online supplement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g001
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to self-interest.
To make use of these payoff rules, individuals must assess their
risks of infection with (dk) and without (ak) vaccination. Our model
assumes that individuals estimate these risks based on past
information and their own degree, which we assume individuals
know accurately. In the simplest case, we assume that individuals
use the observed distributions of influenza cases in the prior season
to compute the probability that they will become infected in a
future season. That is, they operate under the assumption that
attack rates will be similar from one season to the next. These
estimates will be incorrect to the extent that vaccination patterns
differ from the prior season.
The estimation of epidemiological risks depends on a key
variable: the probability that a random contact remains uninfected
throughout an epidemic (f). Suppose that a fraction vk of
individuals with degree k are vaccinated, and that a fraction r of
vaccinated individuals acquire immunity to infection, whereas
1{r of vaccinated individuals remain fully susceptible. (Note that
if instead we were to assume that vaccination imparts a certain
degree of protection per contact, then high degree individuals
might not have sufficient incentive to vaccinate with imperfect
vaccines because they would likely maintain a high level of
epidemiological risk. See Sec. 4 of online supplement for a brief
discussion of this.) The probability of infection for an unvaccinated
individual with degree k is given by
ak~1{ 1{ 1{f ðÞ T ðÞ
k ð4Þ
[8] and using the vaccine efficacy term r from above, the
probability of infection for a vaccinated individual of degree k is
dk~ 1{r ðÞ ak: ð5Þ
To find the probability f of a random contact avoiding infection,
based on the epidemic in the prior season, we solve the following
self-consistency equation (derived in Text S1)
f~
P?
k~1 kwk   v vkrz   v vk 1{r ðÞ z 1{  v vk ðÞ ½  1{ 1{f ðÞ T ½ 
k{1
no
P?
k~1 kwk
: ð6Þ
where the vaccination fractions reflect behavior in the prior
season.
Thus, f is the cornerstone of the individual risk assessment
component of the decision process. Because f depends on the net
vaccination rates of individuals of different degrees, the payoff
function for individuals of degree k depends not only on the
individual’s current vaccination strategy vk, but also on the net
vaccination rates for all degrees   v v1,   v v2,.... Thus, we rewrite the
payoff functions as Uk vk;  v v1,  v v2 ... ðÞ . In trying to maximize their
payoffs, individuals decide to vaccinate at the start of an influenza
season when the benefit of vaccination in preventing infection
exceeds its costs; and they base their estimates of current risk on
the prevalence in the previous season. An individual can
approximate f based on how many contacts were sick in the
previous season, however we make the assumption here that
individuals gauge f accurately.
Figure 1A illustrates that higher degree individuals perceive
greater overall risk of infection and are thus more likely to
vaccinate. (We believe that risk (1{f), the probability that a
random contact was infected during the prior season, is a more
intuitive quantity than f and use it in the diagrams throughout this
paper.) The threshold between vaccinating and not vaccinating
moves to lower and lower degree as the risk per edge increases. For
example, at a perceived risk of 0:3, individuals with at least 25
contacts are expected to vaccinate, whereas at a perceived risk of
0:6, this threshold drops to a degree of 12.
We also consider an extended version of the model in which
individuals infer their infection risk from several past epidemics
rather than just from the prior season. Let ^ f ft be the perceived
probability of a random contact not becoming infected in year t,
and ft to be the actual probability of a random contact not
becoming infected. A more general model for the dynamics of
perception is then given by the recursive equation
^ f ft~ 1{s ðÞ ft{1zs^ f ft{1, ð7Þ
where the parameter s controls the duration of memory: s~0
means that individuals base their behaviors on only the most
recent epidemic’s size (the simple model), s~1 means individuals
ignore the recent data in favour of their initial belief, and
intermediate values mean that individuals weigh information
across all prior epidemics, with an emphasis on more recent
seasons. In both the simple and extended models, individuals are
essentially making decisions based on infection risk in previous
seasons. These and other model parameters and variables are
summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Results
To examine the interplay among network structure, decision-
making, and disease spread, we compare vaccination and disease
Table 1. Model parameters describing network structure and cost structure.
symbol description value
wk the probability that a random individual has degree k
T average probability that an infected contact infects an unvaccinated individual during his/her infectious period
cV actual cost of vaccination $27a
cI perceived cost of infection to an unvaccinated individual $73b
cR perceived cost of infection to a partially resistant (immune) person $43b
rperceived perceived efficacy – probability that vaccination yields immunity 0:69b
ractual actual efficacy – probability that vaccination yields immunity 0:77c
All must be specified a priori. ((a) Luce et al. [19], TIV costs Table 2, (b) Galvani et al. [4] (weighted by age in urban population), (c) Bansal et al. [13], Table 2 (weighted by
age in urban population).)
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.t001
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networks. We start by assuming that individuals only use the
previous season for assessing their risks (that is, risk is determined
by Equation (7) with s~0). Figure 2 illustrates the basic dynamics
of our model and the impact of network structure on them. Our
calculations show that if individuals update their vaccination
strategies each season in response to changes in their perceived
risk, then the actual risk itself will change from one season to the
next (Figure 2A). High risk in the prior season will lead to high
vaccination rates and thus low disease risk in the current season,
and vice versa. A strategy set v ~ v 
1 ...v 
?
  
is a Nash equili-
brium if individuals of each degree are using a best-response
strategy and the annual risk f is not changing; rational responses to
individual-level perceptions of risk lead to vaccination patterns
that are constant from one epidemic period to the next. The Nash
equilibrium always takes the formv ~ 0,0,0,0,...,v 
i ,...,1,1,1,1,1
  
with v 
i in 0,1 ½  as shown in the online supplement. Figure 2B
shows the impact of network structure (degree distribution) on
Nash equilibria levels of risk and the threshold degrees above
which everyone vaccinates at these equilibria. In this case
(T~0:078), the Nash degree threshold for vaccination increases
with the heterogeneity of the degree distribution; however the
fraction of the population predicted to vaccinate at the Nash
equilibrium does not change monotonically with network
heterogeneity (6.8% vaccinate in the urban network, followed by
0.75% and 0.066% in the homogenized and power law networks,
respectively).
Our urban network has most individuals with between 10 and
30 contacts, and thus with our model represents a network ranging
between moderate and high levels of epidemiological risk. Here, at
equilibrium, the degree threshold for vaccination is relatively low
(about 26 contacts) a proportion of 0.07 of the population
vaccinates (higher than in the power-law case), but those
individuals not vaccinating are well enough connected to keep
population-wide risk relatively high (1{f~0:29). In contrast to
the urban network, the power law network is comprised of a
majority of low degree individuals with few opportunities for
disease transmission and a small but important minority of very
high degree individuals that can readily protect themselves
through vaccination. Thus, relative to the urban network, the
scale free (power law) network has a lower equilibrium level of risk
(1{f~0:07), higher degree threshold for vaccination (about 109
contacts), and a smaller fraction of the population that is expected
to vaccinate (0.0007). Our homogenized urban network has fewer
high degree individuals than the urban network, so the population
has lower incentive to vaccinate. At Nash equilibrium, the
proportion vaccinating is lower (0.007) and the epidemiological
risk is higher than in the urban network. Although this model
always has a unique Nash equilibrium, the dynamics need not
converge to this equilibrium, as described below.
When we take a closer look at these dynamics in the more
realistic urban network across three different levels of transmissi-
bility (T), we find that when risk in the prior season is lowest (zero),
individuals perceive no risk and thus do not vaccinate for the
current season (Figure 3). Consequently, disease sweeps through
the population unhindered by vaccination, resulting in the
maximum possible transmission (risk). Although the equilibrium
risk level is not generally monotone in the transmissibility
(Figures 3A, 3B), the equilibrium level of vaccination does
monotonically increase with transmissibility (Figure 3D), which
will always be the case for the given Eq. (4) and (5) (see Text S1).
Changes in transmissibility affect risk and ultimately the Nash
Table 2. Other variables used when describing the
transmission network structure.
symbol description
Tc critical transmissibility threshold
f probability a random contact is not infected per epidemic
Risk probability of a random contact being infected per epidemic
(that is, 1{f)
ak probability that an unvaccinated individual of degree k
becomes infected
dk probability that a vaccinated individual of degree k becomes
infected
vk probability an individual of degree k will vaccinate
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.t002
Figure 2. Risk from one season to the next and equilibria in the homogeneous, urban and power-law networks. (A) The inter-seasonal
risk map showing the relationship between risk in one season and risk in the next season, assuming everybody acts to maximize his or her payoff (as
in Figure 1A). The line fx ðÞ ~x indicates constant level of risk from one season to the next, and an intersection of the response risk curve with this line
represents a Nash Equilibrium. The stairstep shape seen in the homogeneous and urban networks is also present in the power-law example but
appears smooth here as the steps are very small in comparison to the line width. (B) Each of these intersection points corresponds to an equilibrium
level of risk (horizontal lines) and vaccination threshold degrees (vertical lines). Both figures assume that transmissibility is T~0:078.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g002
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at very low and very high transmissibilities is similar, indicating
that, in terms of risk, additional vaccinations can compensate for
the increased transmissibility and f (Figure 3C).
Figure 4A shows a cobwebbing diagram to illustrate the
dynamics in a particular example and how convergent and
dynamic stability can be determined from it and similar plots in
Figures 2A and 3A. Dynamic stability refers to whether or not a
very slight perturbation will cause oscillations in a population at
equilibrium. In some cases, dynamic instability corresponds to a
situation where the equilibrium requires a degree class to be
partially vaccinating. As individuals base their decisions on f and
their degree, there can only be one partially vaccinating degree
class: individuals with higher degree will get vaccinated, while
those with lower degree will not. Within the partially-vaccinating
degree class, the payoff if vaccinating must be identical to the
Figure 3. The effect of transmissibility on risk and vaccination dynamics. (A) The effect of transmissibility (T) on inter-seasonal change in risk
in the urban network. Equilibria occur at intersections with black (fx ðÞ ~x) line. (B) As the transmissibility increases, the equilibrium vaccination
threshold and risk change non-monotonically. For low T (T~0:06, magenta) the equilibrium level of risk is less than 0.2 per year, and the vaccination
threshold is greater than the maximum degree in the network. Consequently, nobody in the population is expected to vaccinate. For intermediate T
(T~0:078, blue), the equilibrium risk is near 0.5 per year and only a small fraction of the most connected individuals vaccinate. At high T (T~0:26,
orange), a large fraction of individuals vaccinate, leaving an intermediate level of risk. (C) As both risk and transmissibility increase, vaccination
behavior increases. (D) Consequently, the equilibrium level of vaccination is an increasing function of the transmission rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g003
Figure 4. Cobwebbing diagrams of risk and vaccination rates. (A) shows the inter-seasonal risk relation and (B) the corresponding fractions of
the population expected to vaccinate as a best response to the perceived risk of infection for the urban network when T~0:26 and s~0. Whether
vaccination rate (or f) is stable from season to season depends on the slope of the inter-seasonal risk relation at the equilibrium (the slope of the
intersections above or likewise in Figures 2A and 3A. When this slope is zero, there is a partially vaccinating degree class at equilibrium and the
system is dynamically unstable, and otherwise (infinite slope) there are no partially vaccinating classes and it is dynamically stable. Additionally, when
the ‘‘average’’ slope has magnitude less than one, the system is convergently stable. Conversely, if the magnitude of the average slope is greater than
one, it is not convergently stable. The dynamics shown are both dynamically and convergently unstable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g004
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any arbitrarily small perturbation in risk is sufficient to make the
degree class either fully vaccinate or not vaccinate at all. When
there is no partially vaccinating class, that is, when the threshold
cleanly divides the population into two groups, arbitrarily small
perturbations to risk have no such effect. Convergent stability is
important also, as it indicates whether populations close to the
Nash equilibrium evolve toward it. If the equilibrium is
convergently unstable but there is no partially vaccinating degree
class, a population sitting on the Nash equilibrium will stay there
due to the disincentive for anyone to change their strategy.
However, any small forced perturbation away from the Nash
equilibrium (such as that caused by environmental stochasticity)
will cause the population to move away from the Nash
equilibrium. If the population is convergently stable, but the Nash
equilibrium has a partially vaccinating degree class, we expect the
population to move toward the equilibrium and end in reaching a
2-cycle with only one degree class switching between vaccination
and non-vaccination and other classes maintaining constant
behaviors.
Steady-state risks (corresponding to Nash Equilibria) and
unstable limit cycles change as transmissibility increases for our
homogenized network, simulated urban network, and power law
network (Figure 5). Although we focus our discussion on the
dynamics of risk, we also plot prevalence (proportion of population
infected) (Figure 6). For intermediate transmissibility values, risk is
predicted to oscillate considerably from one season to the next,
with the lower branch reaching close to zero (Figure 5). As noted
above, this indicates virtually no vaccination in one season
followed by wide-spread disease and consequently high vaccina-
tion in the next. The dynamic behavior over the whole
transmissibility interval differs significantly from the bifurcations
seen by [7]. Rather than exhibiting the common period-doubling
cascade to chaos, the bifurcation pattern exhibits a period-
bubbling pattern [20] that returns to steady-state for large
transmissibilities. In fact, it is not possible to achieve an orbit of
more than two oscillation points in our model when only one
season is considered (see Text S1). For transmissibilities below the
critical transmissibility value (TC) of 0.055, there are no epidemics,
and so risk is always zero. After this cutoff, the Nash risk rises
quickly as epidemics then become possible. At this point we see a
branching of orbit values, where the Nash solution is no longer
dynamically stable. The curve representing Nash solutions takes
on a sawtooth pattern. Higher transmissibilities yield higher
vaccination rates at the Nash equilibrium (see Text S1). The
decreases of the Nash curves in Figure 5 are caused by increasing
vaccination rates of partially-vaccinating degree classes. Recall
that the Nash solutions often contain one partially vaccinating
degree class; the increase of vaccinators within a given class more
than compensates for the increase in transmissibility, causing a
decrease in risk. Increases in the diagrams correspond to cases
when the changes in strategies are not sufficient to counterbalance
the increases in transmissibility or when increases in transmissi-
bility have no effect on the vaccination strategies at equilibrium.
There are two causes for this second situation: newly vaccinating
degree classes may contain no individuals and thus have no effect
on risk; and some values of transmissibility are between the point
that a degree class K is fully vaccinated and that at which Kz1
would begin vaccinating; that is to say, there are no partial
vaccinating classes.
We also found that the oscillations in the homogeneous and
urban networks are more extreme at low T values than in the
power law network, yet they stabilize at high T values. The steady-
state values also show different trends: they exhibit a sharp
decrease around T~0:1 in the urban network and an even
sharper decrease in the homogeneous network, but generally
increase with T in the powerlaw network. Figure 6 shows the same
pattern in prevalence: the increase of prevalence with transmis-
sibility in the power law network and the surprising decreases of
prevalence in the homogeneous and urban networks. These
differences stem from the larger number of medium degree
individuals in the homogeneous and urban network compared to
the power law network. At low values of T, vaccination and
behavioral fluctuations occur only in high degree classes. Although
the power-law network has more extremely high degree
individuals, it has very few of them, and they vaccinate almost
immediately when T is increased; thus compared to the more
homogeneous networks, it experiences less extreme epidemiolog-
ical oscillations. At higher values of T, moderate to high degree
individuals vaccinate and behavioral fluctuations occur in
relatively low degree classes. As low degree groups are much
more numerous in the power-law network than in the other
networks and low degree individuals have very few contacts to
whom they can transmit disease, orbit points converge to the Nash
strategy in the homogeneous and urban networks, whereas the
power law network continues to experience oscillations even at
very high T’s because they have many more low degree
individuals. While the homogeneous and urban networks exhibit
similar dynamics, there are a few differences. In the homogeneous
network, equilibrium risk and prevalence reach higher levels (both
near 0.4). Compared to the urban network, relatively few of the
individuals in the homogeneous network have incentive to
Figure 5. The effect of transmissibility on risk. The impact of transmissibility on risk (steady-states and orbits) for the (A) homogeneous (B)
urban and (C) power-law networks. Nash equilibria are unstable for the majority of the interval between T~:06 and T~0:26; some individuals waver
between accepting and rejecting vaccination.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g005
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homogeneous network because there are fewer degree classes
whose behavior can change as transmissibility increases.
So far, we have assumed that individuals predict current risk
based solely on prevalence during the prior season. While this
provides valuable insights into the potential impacts of past
behavior and disease spread on future decisions and transmission,
it is unlikely that people base their decisions on such simple
considerations. Thus we also consider cases of Eq. (7) where
0vsv1, corresponding to a geometric-discounting of historical
epidemic risks. Recent seasons are thereby weighted more heavily
than more distant seasons, with s controlling the historical inertia
(Figure 7A). When we extend the time-horizon for decision
making in this way, the oscillations begin to disappear (Figure 7B).
In Figure 8, we see the effect of varying T for different s values.
The general pattern is that the larger s is, the less inter-seasonal
variation there is, and in fact it converges upon the steady-state
strategy. Additionally, the larger the value of s, the longer it takes
the system to forget the initial conditions of our simulation; in the
real world this might mean longer to forget an uncharacteristically
high or low disease prevalence season.
Our results illustrate that network structure greatly impacts
vaccine and disease dynamics, both in terms of the points of
oscillation and the Nash strategy. They also show that, as
individuals increasingly look backwards in time, these oscillations
collapse onto the Nash strategy for all transmissibilities.
Discussion
Network structure can have important effects on the spread of
infectious diseases like influenza. Typically, high degree individ-
uals are more quickly infected [21], but whether an individual
becomes infected during an influenza epidemic depends not only
on his or her contact patterns, but on the overall connectivity of
the population [9]. Our model suggests that vaccination behavior
similarly depends on both local and global connectivity. We have
assumed that individuals have accurate information about the risk
in the previous season and their own degree. In reality,
individuals may approximate their risk by knowing how many
of their contacts were previously sick or also by media sources,
but, in our analysis, they know their own degree and the per-
contact risk in the population in the previous season. Our
comparison of a semi-empirical urban network and an exponen-
tially-scaled power law network shows that, under the simplifying
assumptions of our model, equilibrium behavior may be very
different for individuals with identical numbers of contacts in the
two networks. In the scaled power-law network, most individuals
have very low degree and are unlikely to become infected. Thus
even high degree individuals will perceive a relatively low risk,
because few of their (low degree) contacts will have been infected
in prior seasons. In the urban network model, contact patterns
are more homogeneous and thus epidemiological risk is also more
homogeneous.
Figure 6. The effect of transmissibility on prevalence. The impact of transmissibility on prevalence (steady-states and orbits) for the (A)
homogeneous (B) urban and (C) power-law networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g006
Figure 7. The effect of memory on vaccination decisions. (A) Contributions of past seasons to current perceptions of risk, under different s
values. (B) The impact of prior information on oscillations when T~0:26: longer memory decreases variability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g007
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with degree, because the probability of infection increases with
number of contacts (specified in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5)). This is
consistent with observed correlations in vaccination behavior from
one year to the next [22]. However, given that children tend to
have higher numbers of contacts than adults, it is not necessarily
consistent with the empirical observation that older adults
vaccinate at the highest rates, followed by adults and then children
[4]. While this discrepancy may reflect non-rational or public
policy-driven behavior, it also stems, in part, from our simplifying
assumption that risks associated with flu are homogeneous
throughout the population. In fact, the severity of seasonal flu is
thought to be highest for the youngest and oldest age groups [23].
This model can be extended easily to explicitly consider this
pattern and other age-specific behavior, risks and perceptions; and
such extensions may reveal complex interactions between
sociological (network) and biological driven risks factors.
Our model also suggests that vaccination behavior may depend
critically on the transmissibility of the circulating strain of
influenza. For low levels of transmissibility, below the epidemic
threshold, there is no epidemiological risk and thus nobody
vaccinates. Just above the epidemic threshold, vaccination levels
are predicted to converge to a stable Nash equilibrium, and the
proportion of the population vaccinating increases as the
transmissibility of the strain increases (Figure 3D). Individuals
with more than a threshold number of contacts are expected to
vaccinate, while those with fewer contacts are not. However,
above a critical value of transmissibility, the model shows
oscillatory vaccination behavior rather than an attracting
equilibrium strategy. The population alternates between near-
universal vaccination of all but the least connected individuals and
vaccination limited to only the most highly connected individuals
(Figure 6). Ultimately, at unrealistically high levels of transmissi-
bility, the dynamics stabilize on a single equilibrium strategy.
Differences in network shapes largely affect these characteristics;
for example, in the urban network, increases in transmissibility
may actually decrease prevalence, a trend not possible in our
power law network (Figure 6) and one that seems not to be
highlighted in previous models.
A natural question that emerges is whether a corresponding
homogeneous-mixing model would exhibit these types of oscilla-
tions. Regardless of presence or absence of network structure,
there may be a general propensity for such behavior-prevalence
systems to oscillate, due to overcompensation mechanisms similar
to those that cause oscillations in simple predator-prey models
such as the Lotka-Volterra model. For instance, when disease
prevalence is very low due to high vaccine coverage, rational
individuals will stop vaccinating. The susceptible pool then grows
and an outbreak occurs. Individuals begin to vaccinate again in
large numbers, which thus drives the prevalence down to levels
even lower than would occur if vaccine coverage were constant
over time, and the cycle repeats. In empirically plausible
parameter regimes of previous (non-network) behavior-prevalence
models, little or no oscillatory behavior has been observed [4,24].
However, in other parameter regimes, these and other non-
network models oscillate in ways that mirror the oscillations
observed in the present network model [24,25]. When we
compared our homogenized urban network with our original
urban network, there were no major differences, but whether
network structure per se enhances or suppress oscillations in
behavior-prevalence systems is not yet clear and would be an
interesting topic for future research.
To what degree are oscillations seen in reality? Annual rates are
not constant, but neither are they oscillatory to the extent possible
in the model [26–28]. There was rapid expansion in coverage in
the 1980’s and 1990’s as seasonal influenza vaccines gained
acceptance, followed by a saturation to approximately constant
coverage [26,28]. An autocorrelation analysis of these data sets
indicates no statistically significant correlation at lag two, or any
other lag up to and including five years. A straightforward, but
unlikely explanation is that the transmissibility of influenza is
below the level at which vaccination behavior is predicted to
Figure 8. Longer-term memory reduces oscillations for various transmissibilities. As s increases, individuals integrate more of their prior
epidemiological experiences into their decision-making and two-cycles disappear. (A) s~0:30 (B) s~0:45 (C) s~0:60 (D) s~0:85.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.g008
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mately span the range 0:06vTv0:26 [13]. The explanation
more likely rests on the assumptions of our vaccination decision
model. In our initial model individuals make choices based solely
on attack rates in the prior seasons. However, people use more
heterogeneous decision heuristics and do not base their decisions
exclusively on such information. Our model assumes that by
knowing the number of their own contacts and per-contact risk in
the population, individuals accurately estimate their own risks of
infection in a comparable outbreak (same pathogen, same
population, same levels of vaccination). In reality, one might not
be able to estimate previous risk accurately and one may not
properly assess his or her own likelihood of becoming sick even
given perfect information about prior prevalence. Additionally, we
assumed that individuals slightly over a particular risk cut-off
vaccinate and those slightly under this cut-off do not. By contrast,
the decision processes might be less sensitive to such small
differences and possibly less deterministic. Lastly, some people
might think back further in predicting their risk for the current
season, and this degree of heterogeneity of memories may prevent
oscillations.
In a study of measles vaccination, Philipson concludes that
disease prevalence is an important factor in determining
individuals’ vaccination decisions [29]. Although our model
assumes that this is also the case for influenza, there are likely
many constraints on vaccine coverage other than individual
choice, including vaccination policies, accessibility of immuniza-
tion services, and having sufficient vaccine production capability to
meet demand [30]. Individual choice itself likely depends also
upon factors other than the attack rate in the previous season, such
as the recommendations of physicians, the opinions of peers, an
individual’s state of health, and vaccine cost [27,31]. Any tendency
toward periodic cycles in vaccine coverage in the empirical data
could easily be masked by these other determinants of vaccine
coverage in real settings. Additionally, if behavior were modelled
stochastically, so that greater marginal utility led to increased
likelihood of vaccination, it would also likely dampen oscillation.
Indeed, multi-season memory alone is sufficient to dampen the
two-cycles observed in the model (Figure 8). The simplicity of our
model allows a large degree of analytical rigour and cobwebbing
facilitates comparison with classical models of population biology.
Moreover, it demonstrates that global network structure can
strongly influence not only the disease dynamics directly, but less
directly as well by altering vaccination behavior.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Derivations and theory.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001062.s001 (0.30 MB PDF)
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